Darryl A. GoldbergChicago Criminal Defense Lawyer | Cook County Federal and State Crimes Attorney | Illinois Drug Crime Law Firm2026-07-02T13:48:15Zhttps://www.goldbergdefense.com/feed/atom/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/sites/1602988/2020/10/cropped-apple-touch-icon-32x32.pngOn Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Will the Courts Overturn AR-15 Bans?]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484942026-07-02T13:48:15Z2026-07-02T13:48:15ZSupreme Court Agrees to Hear Challenges to Cook County, Illinois and Connecticut Assault Weapons BansOn June 30, 2026, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in two closely watched Second Amendment cases challenging local and state bans on AR-15-style rifles, one out of Cook County, Illinois, and one out of Connecticut. The cases will be argued and decided during the Court’s next term, which begins in October 2026. Cook County’s ordinance, known as the Blair Holt Assault Weapons Ban, bars residents from owning, buying, or transferring AR-15s and roughly 125 other types of rifles. First adopted in 1993 and updated since, the ban was upheld by the Seventh Circuit in 2015 and again in 2019, which the Supreme Court declined to review in the past, although certain justices previewed that they were likely to grant review in the future as more cases and circuit splits mounted. The current challenge, brought by Cook County residents Cutberto Viramontes and Christopher Khaya along with gun rights organizations, argues that the AR-15 is owned by tens of millions of law-abiding Americans and therefore cannot be considered a “dangerous and unusual” weapon subject to a categorical ban. The companion Connecticut case involves that state’s assault weapons law, tightened after the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, which the Second Circuit upheld under the historical-tradition framework the Supreme Court established in its 2022 decision recognizing a right to carry firearms in public.
What Does This Mean for Those Already Convicted or Facing Criminal Charges?
Both Illinois and federal prosecutors in Illinois regularly bring weapons charges involving semiautomatic rifles and other firearms covered by assault weapons statutes. A Supreme Court ruling striking down these bans, or even significantly narrowing how they can be applied, could directly affect the viability of pending and future possession charges premised on these laws and even allow for challenges to past convictions, depending on how the Court rules and whether any relief could be retroactive. However, for practical purposes this should not have a huge effect, because the prosecutions usually hinge on the defendant being a felon or prohibited person in possession of a firearm, not a prosecution for possession of a banned type of weapon by an otherwise lawful possessor of firearms. With that said, if the law is declared unconstitutional, it could have a similar outcome for many Illinois residents who challenged their convictions under a previous statute limiting gun possession outside the home that was later ruled unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in the landmark 2013 decision in People v. Aguilar that saw many people seeking to overturn their previous convictions. While the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case, anyone seeking similar reprieves will have to wait for likely around a year before they rule on the matter, and there is no guarantee how the Court will rule, although it has recently generally found to be in favor of Second Amendment challengers. Cook County State’s Attorney Eileen O’Neill Burke has signaled the County intends to vigorously defend the ordinance and until the Court rules otherwise, the existing bans remain in full force, and prosecutions under them will continue. Defendants currently facing charges should not automatically assume relief is coming, but they should be building the record now to take advantage of it if it does. In appropriate cases, it may be worth seeking a stay or continuance pending the Supreme Court’s decision, particularly where a client’s exposure turns substantially on a weapons count tied to a banned rifle.]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Are Geofence Warrants Legal After Supreme Court Ruling?]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484922026-07-01T13:40:39Z2026-07-01T13:40:39ZSupreme Court Rules Geofence Warrants Are a Fourth Amendment SearchAs we have previously covered, the Supreme Court signaled that they would review the legality of “Geofencing,” the investigation tool police use when they know a crime occurred at a particular place and time, but do not have a suspect, and conduct a search using location data for every cell phone inside a specific area at the time of the alleged crime, when they took up the case and heard oral arguments. The basic idea is to work backward from the location data to acquire a list of possible suspects, which the government argued does not rise to the level of an unreasonable inquiry concerning the privacy protections for individuals guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Earlier this week, the Supreme Court issued it opinion on the case, Chatrie v. United States, holding that police conduct a Fourth Amendment search when they obtain a person’s Google “Location History” through a geofence warrant, extending the logic of their previous decision, Carpenter v. United States, which will have real consequences for how location data is used in criminal investigations. To briefly summarize the facts of the case in Chatrie, police were investigating a 2019 bank robbery in Virginia and obtained a geofence warrant for Google’s Location History service, which records a user’s location roughly every two minutes, can place a phone within about twenty meters, and can even estimate which floor of a building the phone is on. Google ultimately produced identifying information for its users in the area at the time of the robbery, including Okello Chatrie, whose data showed he entered the geofenced area shortly before the robbery occurred. Chatrie challenged the investigatory process, and this opinion followed his appeals.
Court Rules Fourth Amendment Protections at Play but Leaves Open Question for Future Challenges
In its ruling, by a 6-3 decision, the Court held that accessing Location History data is a search because a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, explained that everything the Court relied on in Carpenter to find a search of cell-site data applied “as well or better” to Location History, which is, “’the most sweeping, granular, and comprehensive tool’ existing today for collecting and storing location data.” In arriving at this conclusion, the Court rejected the government’s arguments to the contrary, instead ruling that “an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information.” First, it refused to recognize a so-called “grace period” for short windows of data that the government argued for, clearly stating that it does not matter that the police obtained only two hours of location information because the Fourth Amendment does not kick in only once an intrusion “goes too far.” Second, the Court declined to apply the third-party doctrine, which generally holds that when an individual shares information with a third party they forfeit their expectation of constitutionally protected privacy, for such intrusive and pervasive information as this type of cell phone data. Essentially that Location History is “not truly shared” in any ordinary sense, and the government argument to the contrary “misapprehends the very nature of modern cell-phone use,” since it is generated automatically when a person uses the ordinary features of a smartphone, and thus a user isn’t opening themselves up to sharing private information with the government, “just by doing the ordinary things cell-phone users do.”However, the ruling was not an outright win for privacy advocates and those who wish to use it as a definitive ruling for future challenges in similar criminal cases, as the Court decided only that a search occurred. It did not decide whether the search was unreasonable, and it did not decide whether the evidence in Chatrie’s own case will be suppressed, instead opting to remand the issue back to the lower courts. Most strikingly, as the dissent by Justice Alito points out, the Court expressly declined to address the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule that the Fourth Circuit had previously found would likely allow the admission of evidence in this particular case since the legality of geofence warrants at the time was an open question. The trial court had admitted the evidence under that exception, and the Supreme Court left that question open for the lower court to revisit on remand given this ruling. In other words, the decision does not outright eliminate the good-faith exception in this or similar cases to date, and it does not automatically suppress evidence already gathered through geofence warrants. In the end, Chatrie confirms that location data held by technology companies is protected by the Fourth Amendment, and its reasoning reaches beyond geofences to other types of investigatory tools using cell phone data. The Court’s rejection of the “short duration” and “voluntary sharing” arguments applies to a wide range of app-generated, cloud-stored personal data that can be accessed via a cell phone, not just Location History. However, while it may not help the defendant who brought the challenge in this Supreme Court case, the case effectively places law enforcement on notice of the issues with Geofencing and an officer seeking to invoke good faith on a defective warrant in the future will fail. For anyone whose case involves location data, a cell phone, or digital records held by a third party, these developments underscore how much can turn on the specific nuanced facts related to the gathering of evidence by law enforcement.]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[How Federal Sentencing Works in Fraud Cases]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484912026-06-29T13:42:42Z2026-06-30T13:40:59ZWhy the “Loss Amount” Is Often the Key FactorWhen someone is under investigation or charged with a federal fraud offense, one number that will be of vital importance is what is known as the “loss amount.” Oftentimes, this figure will matter more than any individual’s background or their underlying conduct/motivation for their alleged transgression. In fact, depending on the case, this “loss amount” can be the single most important factor at sentencing, more than how the scheme worked, and more than whether an individual ever saw a dollar of the money. Understanding how that number is built, and how it can be fought, can be the single most important thing a person facing a federal fraud charge can do before sentencing.Federal fraud, theft, and embezzlement cases, are sentenced under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, generally beginning with section 2B1.1. We have previously given an overview of what the federal sentencing guidelines are and how they generally apply here, but this will provide another general overview in these specific types of cases as they relate to sentencing. Often the starting “offense level” is low, a 6 or 7, but a tiered loss table can add up to 30 levels on top of it depending on what the “loss” amount is calculated to be, a table of which can be found here. Whatever that amount is ultimately calculated to be can add years or even decades to any starting advisory guideline range. As an example, a defendant with a base level of 7 and a $2 million loss figure receives a 16-level enhancement, jumping to level 23 before any other factor is even considered. For someone with no criminal history, this alone elevates an advisory guideline sentence from 0-6 month range (and probation eligible) to a 46-57 month custodial sentencing range alone. This is why, in fraud cases, the fight over the loss amount is very often the most crucial sentencing factor when determining the advisory sentencing guideline range. The good news for anyone facing sentencing is that the guidelines are advisory, the government’s loss figure is frequently inflated, and an experienced criminal defense lawyer can often drive those numbers much lower before even considering and addressing other mitigating factors.
The Difference Between Actual Loss and Intended Loss
As the guidelines are currently written and enforced, in the vast majority of cases, the loss figure is calculated as the greater of “actual loss” or “intended loss.” “Actual loss” is the real, foreseeable financial harm caused in any fraud scheme, whereas “intended loss” is the harm the defendant attempted to cause through various methods, even if the loss ultimately never materialized, was impossible, or the defendant knew it was highly unlikely to occur at the time of the alleged transgression. In practice, this means by way of example, that a scheme designed to obtain $2 million in fraudulent earnings that was stopped through law enforcement intervention or only ended up with an actual loss of $400,000, will still be sentenced on the full $2 million in most instances, greatly increasing the base level offense. For years, defendants argued that “loss” should mean only actual loss, and in certain situations have persuaded some judges to agree, although recent changes have made those arguments harder, but not foreclosed based on the right facts and persuasive advocacy. Moreover, if the actual or intended loss is too difficult to determine, the Court can sentence a defendant based on the gain to the defendant.Because the loss figure often carries so much weight, it is often where skilled defense work can pay the largest dividends. The government bears the burden of proving loss by a preponderance of the evidence, and the sentencing court needs only a reasonable estimate and not mathematical certainty, but “reasonable” leaves enormous room to push back, particularly in fraud cases where the final number can be more difficult to calculate. Furthermore, since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, the guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. The judge must calculate the range correctly to begin a sentencing hearing, but then must weigh the other sentencing factors accordingly in arriving at a just sentence that is not greater than necessary. This matters enormously in fraud cases, where the loss table has long been criticized for producing ranges that overstate a defendant’s real culpability and can help lead to below guideline sentences. While sentences in fraud cases are often highly influenced by the loss calculation and the advisory guideline range, a proper investigation that begins long before sentencing, and zealous advocacy can result in below guideline and even non-custodial sentences like probation. A well-supported and detailed sentencing memorandum and meaningful investigation into a defendant’s background and circumstances that led to the commission of the crime are what frequently separates the advisory guideline number from the sentence ultimately imposed. If you have received a target letter, a grand jury subpoena, or have been charged with a federal financial crime, the time to build a strategy around a potential “loss” figure is now.]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Can You Beat a Federal Criminal Case?]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484902026-06-29T13:40:14Z2026-06-29T13:40:14ZCharges Dismissed After Video Contradicts Agent’s Narrative in ArrestEarlier this month, federal prosecutors in Chicago charged three men with trying to rob undercover agents during an A.T.F. gun-trafficking sting in south suburban Country Club Hills. On paper, the initial indictment had every indication to the naked eye of a strong federal case, including a sworn affidavit from an F.B.I. special agent, an alleged armed robbery of law enforcement, and the full weight of a federal complaint against those charged. However, as evidence of an independent cell phone video emerged, the case collapsed, culminating in the charges against the defendants being dismissed, with possible sanctions on the horizon over how the case was handled.According to the initial criminal complaint, 18-year-old Demond Edwards ran from a Chicago police officer assigned to an A.T.F. task force and then punched the officer in the face, which the officer said was the reason he opened fire. The affidavit described the man who pointed a gun at the agents as dressed all in black, including a balaclava-style head covering. The video, however, told an entirely different story. Edwards was wearing a blue shirt with nothing covering his head, and the footage does not show him punching the officer before he was shot. Prosecutors, after being made aware of the video which they claim they had not seen before charging the individuals, dismissed the charges after concurring that the video showed key inconsistencies in the fact pattern laid out in the indictment. However, the U.S. Attorney’s Office is free to recharge the individuals, and so far have cautioned that their “decision to dismiss the complaint today should not be read at all as a retreat of this case or the events giving rise to charges,” said in a statement following the dismissal. Legal analyst, Irv Miller, argued that this most recent misstep highlights that currently, “There's a credibility issue by the U.S. Attorney's Office, and potentially by law enforcement.” While the media and others have seemingly attacked the conduct of the U.S. Attorney’s Office of late, there are others that believe that the decisions of the district’s top prosecutor have been entirely appropriate and an effort to do the right thing. In this instance, the government may choose to simply move on, though it is too early to determine.
Evidence of Other Questionable Federal Law Enforcement Tactics in the Headlines
The Country Club Hills case is not an isolated example of aggressive federal tactics drawing recent scrutiny. Around the same time, the Associated Press reported that the D.E.A. had allowed hundreds of thousands of fentanyl pills to reach the streets of New Mexico between 2023 and 2025, deliberately declining to seize shipments of the drugs the agents were actively watching, in order to build bigger cases against presumably larger traffickers. One D.E.A. agent who blew the whistle on the practice described the cost in stark terms, saying, “We poisoned our community to make cases.” The DEA claims in response to the report that the decisions were lawful, reasonable, and consistent with department guidance, and that the operations involved court-authorized wiretaps with real-time surveillance of larger trafficking organizations which culminated in the eventual largest fentanyl seizure in DEA history seizure of over 3 million pills in 2025. However, the Justice Department's 2017 “Fentanyl Protocols” instructed agents to seize or prevent distribution “as soon as practicable” and declared that protecting public safety is paramount, even at the cost of an investigation, given the deadly nature of fentanyl. In 2024 those rules were rewritten to give agents more discretion, allowing them to balance public-safety risks against investigative benefits, but a tension remains, with one former supervisor alleging that they could have dismantled the organization six months earlier than they ultimately did. Although the two stories may seem entirely independent, they highlight the fact that federal investigators make discretionary, sometimes aggressive choices about how to run an operation, and those choices do not necessarily always hold up once the full record comes to light. These cases highlight the simple fact that while federal charges can feel overwhelming the moment they are filed, it is important to keep a cool head and realize that all cases unfold differently. Anyone charged or under threat of investigation needs to remember that a complaint or indictment is the government’s initial version of the alleged events. It is an accusation, not proof, and often does not contain the whole story, and the government is even aware of the full story at the time of the charges being filed. With time to review and scrutinize the influx of evidence and discovery, including body-worn cameras, surveillance footage, informant records, sworn affidavits, search warrants, and other vital pieces used to build a criminal case, defense attorneys can use their skills to systemically dismantle the government’s case and secure not guilty verdicts or outright dismissals of charges before trial. ]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Are Silencers Protected by the Second Amendment?]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484892026-06-22T19:27:41Z2026-06-22T19:27:41ZTwo June 2026 Circuit Rulings Create Circuit SplitWithin two weeks this June, two federal appeals courts upheld convictions for possessing an unregistered silencer under the National Firearms Act, (“NFA”) and reached that same result for opposite reasons. The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. DeBorba that silencers are not even “arms” the Second Amendment protects. However, the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Comeaux that silencers in fact are protected arms, yet affirmed the conviction anyway. João DeBorba was convicted after a stipulated-facts bench trial of a stack of firearms offenses, including unlawful possession of an unregistered silencer under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5845(a)(7). On the silencer count, he raised both a Second Amendment and a Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge, which the Ninth Circuit rejected in upholding his conviction. In the separate case, Brennan Comeaux was charged under § 5861(d) with possessing unregistered, homemade silencers. He entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his Second Amendment challenge and was sentenced to 24 months. The Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction, but took a very different path to get there.In DeBorba, the Ninth Circuit held that silencers are not “arms” within the plain text of the Second Amendment at all. Relying on a previous decision in Duncan v. Bonta, the court treated silencers as “optional accessories” or “accoutrements,” treating them similar to slings and scopes for firearms, reasoning that because they are not necessary to a firearm’s ordinary operation they do not rise to the level of protection guaranteed by the Second Amendment. Further, the Court ruled, that even if silencers were arms, the NFA is a presumptively constitutional “shall-issue” licensing regime under footnote 9 of Bruen, the recent Supreme Court decision that has reopened how courts view gun rights in the United States. Because DeBorba offered no evidence that the registration process is put toward “abusive ends,” such as charging exorbitant fees or leading to lengthy processing delays, the scheme nonetheless survives scrutiny. The court also noted that the $200 making/transfer tax was reduced to $0 as of January 1, 2026, which moots any “exorbitant fee” theory built on that previous tax. Taking a completely different stance mere weeks after DeBorba, the Fifth Circuit held that silencers are “arms” under the Second Amendment. In arriving at this opposite conclusion, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that silencers facilitate armed self-defense by reducing loudness and the risk of hearing loss, lowering recoil, eliminating muzzle blast, improving accuracy, and enabling faster follow-up shots. The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the government’s argument that an item must be necessary to a gun’s function, or tied to militia service, to qualify for protection under the Second Amendment, relying on Bruen which requires only that an arm “facilitate armed self-defense,” and the Supreme Court has warned against a “trapped-in-amber” reading frozen at the time of the passage of the Second Amendment. Nonetheless, Comeaux’s conviction was upheld, with the appellate court finding that it was bound by an earlier decision in United States v. Peterson, which found that footnote 9 of Bruen makes the NFA’s shall-issue silencer regime “presumptively lawful” and because Comeaux, like Peterson, never alleged that the regime had been put toward abusive ends, his challenge failed and his conviction was upheld.These decisions are the beginning of a “circuit split” which typically generate new challenges across the country, especially for matters where a person’s liberty and constitutional rights are at stake and make it more likely that the Supreme Court of the United States weighs in on the issue. In practice, any challenge to a federal silencer charge or conviction continues to face steep odds, but anyone facing said charges should at a minimum hire an experienced criminal defense attorney who understands how to appropriately mount a challenge and preserve the constitutional issues at play as more courts continue to weigh in on the issue which may be bound for the Supreme Court. ]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Supreme Court Issues Opinions with Broad Implications for Criminal Defendants]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484882026-06-19T13:35:59Z2026-06-19T13:35:59ZOn June 18, 2026, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions that could have significant implications for certain defendants who are facing charges, serving custodial sentences, or have previously been adjudicated for possessing firearms with a history of drug use or those who were subject to an appellate waiver in their federal plea agreement. In both instances, the justices favored the defense over the government which could enable defendants to fight their cases in new and novel ways. In one, United States v. Hemani, the Court held that the government cannot send a person to prison for up to 15 years just for owning a gun while using marijuana and in the other, Hunter v. United States, the Court ruled that the appeal waiver buried in nearly every plea agreement is no longer infallible and is prone to challenges in certain instances.
Casual Marijuana Users Can Legally Possess a Firearm
The first decision strikes at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the provision that automatically bars anyone who is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm, the same provision previously used to charge Hunter Biden before he was pardoned. In the case at hand, Ali Hemani, a Texas-born dual citizen, told federal agents he used marijuana about every other day after an unrelated raid on his home he shared with his family in which he was cooperative with law enforcement and willingly showed them the location of the firearm and illegal substances. On that admission alone the government charged him under § 922(g)(3), exposing him to up to 15 years in prison and a lifetime firearms ban.Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, held that the prosecution of Hemani was unconstitutional. Applying the framework from the recent Bruen and Rahimi decisions that have drastically altered gun laws in the country (which we have previously covered), the Court rejected the government’s attempt to analogize § 922(g)(3) to historical “habitual drunkard” laws. As the Court put it, those laws “differ dramatically from § 922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision on every single metric the government invites us to consider: They targeted different kinds of people, did so for different purposes, and operated in different ways.” Specifically, in cautioning that the ruling was a narrow one, it explained that historical habitual-drunkard laws reached only those whose drinking “rendered them practically incapacitated and incapable of managing their affairs,” whereas the law as the government applied it to this case would, “automatically disarms anyone who regularly uses any amount of any controlled substance” without any showing of incapacity or danger. The Court was also weary of the process used for disarming people of their right to hold a firearm, as the historical laws referenced also generally required process before someone lost a constitutional right whereas this process, by contrast, “automatically divests an individual of his constitutional right to bear arms the moment he becomes an unlawful user…all without any pre-deprivation process.” Still the Court was quick to caution that this successful challenge does not apply to addicts or those currently under the influence of intoxicants, nor does it address those convicted of felonies generally and a footnote makes clear that, “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt” on the felon-in-possession and mentally-ill provisions of the legal prohibition on gun ownership. While it is not a magic-bullet for anyone accused of owning a firearm while also being a drug user, it draws a meaningful distinction and provides an ability to challenge any conviction or pending charges for accusations of similar drug history for individuals. It is also anticipated to lead to substantial litigation in various states that pose restrictions on concealed carry permits for those that also have medical marijuana licenses.
Appellate Waivers Are Significantly Weakened Under New Standard
In many standard federal plea agreements, the plea will contain a section in which the defendant agrees to waive any appeals of their sentence, with the limited exceptions such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or to challenge sentences based on sentencing guidelines that have subsequently changed and been made retroactive by an act of congress, Supreme Court ruling, or the Sentencing Commission. Generally, federal courts and prosecutors have treated the appeal waiver as the final word on any sentence some absent extremely limited and delineated exceptions. At a change of plea hearing, if the plea agreement calls for an appellate waiver, judges tend to make clear that when a defendant signs the plea agreement and agrees to its terms during the change of plea hearing, they give up their right to appeal their sentence, no matter what the judge does to you at sentencing with only narrow exceptions to that principle.Munson Hunter pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud and waived his right to appeal. At sentencing, the district court ordered him, as a condition of supervised release, to take all mental-health medications prescribed by his physician, over his objection that he should not “be forced to medicate.” He tried to appeal that forced-medication condition. The Fifth Circuit said the waiver barred him, even assuming the condition was unconstitutional. In an 8-1 ruling, Justice Kagan writing for the majority held that, “We principally hold that an agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.” The Court was careful to set the bar high. As Justice Kagan put it, the rule “sets a high bar: The waiver may be set aside only if the sentence is marred by the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. The error must be obvious—not one a judge could reasonably make. And it must be of the type that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary.” The Court went on to make clear that simple, ordinary sentencing mistakes will not render an appellate waiver unenforceable, stating, “Standard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law cannot cancel an appeal waiver.”While this line of “egregious error” was not made clear, Justice Kagan gave three key examples and warned that these are by no means exclusive. The first is obvious, signaling out any sentence that exceeds “what the relevant statute allows—most commonly, a term of years above the maximum prescribed” meaning any sentence higher than what Congress authorized in making the conduct illegal. The second innumerate factor may be the most influential and broad going forward, being any sentence, “infected with a blatant constitutional error, such as when a judge takes account of a constitutionally impermissible factor (like race) or imposes a constitutionally infirm condition of supervised release” which means defendants can likely challenge sentences even with an appellate waiver when they feel the sentence handed down rests on impermissible factors. Third, a sentence “imposed without ‘some minimum of civilized procedure.’” Interestingly, in a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch previewed perhaps the next line of attack for defendants, flagging potential future challenges that a defendant cannot knowingly waive the right to appeal a sentence they have not yet received. Criminal defendants should pay attention to this issue should it become a new line of attack for sentences.Taken together, these two decisions move real ground for federal defendants. If you signed an appeal waiver and received a sentence with a genuinely serious defect, a term above the statutory maximum, a supervised-release condition or sentencing factor that violates the Constitution, or a sentencing process that ignored basic procedural fairness, Hunter means that waiver may no longer bar your appeal. In Hemani, the opinion makes clear that the government can no longer rely on a bare “unlawful user” theory without individualized proof of dangerousness, at least on the facts the Court confronted, and can be used for pending cases or to seek post-conviction relief. Whether a new Supreme Court decision actually helps your case depends on the specific facts surrounding your conviction, the conditions of your sentence, and exactly where your case sits procedurally. If you have a pending federal case, or a family member currently in federal custody, and you think an appeal waiver, a supervised-release condition, or a § 922(g) charge based on being an unlawful user of drugs may be in play, contact a federal criminal defense attorney for an evaluation.]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Illinois Finally Regulates Delta-8]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484872026-06-16T13:33:50Z2026-06-16T13:33:50ZIllinois Enacts Hemp Regulations After Years of Legislative FailureDelta-8 products are known for their intoxicating effects similar to marijuana. When we last covered Illinois’ efforts to regulate Delta-8 after its widening popularity and ubiquitousness across the state, Governor Pritzker had thrown his support behind sweeping legislation that would have effectively moved Delta-8 and other intoxicating hemp-derived products out of gas stations and convenience stores and into licensed cannabis dispensaries. That bill passed the Illinois Senate in a 54-1 vote but never received a vote in the House during the lame-duck session, killed in part by behind-the-scenes maneuvering attributed to Mayor Brandon Johnson over concerns about lost city revenue. However, even at the time, regulation of some kind seemed inevitable, but questions remained as to exactly how sweeping any regulation would be on the growing $800 million industry. This week, Governor Pritzker answered that question when he signed into law legislation that will effectively treat Delta-8 and other intoxicating hemp-derived products under the same regulatory umbrella as recreational marijuana. The new law is largely set to take effect this fall, timed to coincide with a federal ban on hemp edibles, vapes, beverages, and related products that Congress passed last fall, with the notable exception to an immediate ban that will now restrict the sales of hemp-derived products to only those who are 21 and older. The new Illinois law will subject hemp-derived intoxicating products to the same licensing requirements as cannabis dispensaries, while also impacting the marijuana industry in the state by raising cannabis possession limits for Illinois residents to 60 grams of marijuana flower, 1,000 mg of edibles, and 10 grams of concentrate and permitting dispensaries to operate until 2 a.m.
What Will Change with New Law?
While this may seem on its face to be largely a concern for businesses, this change in regulation will have significant practical consequences for individuals wishing to engage with these businesses or those who run them themselves. First, the law expands and will provide for additional criminal offenses which could ensnare businesses and customers alike. Under the prior regulatory landscape, Delta-8 products were legal to sell in a wide range of retail environments without a cannabis license, which included a large amount of gas stations and other sellers near schools, a primary concern for those pushing regulation. Once the new law takes effect this fall, retailers who continue selling intoxicating hemp products without proper licensure will be operating outside the law and subjecting themselves to possible criminal charges and civil penalties. These changes could be confusing, as opponents of the imminent changes have complained. Craig Katz, president of the Illinois Healthy Alternatives Association, was blunt in his assessment of the new law, saying it is, “neither fair nor equitable, not to mention clear or concise,” and questions, “whether it can survive Constitutional muster is a question that will inevitably be answered” in predicting that court challenges will be forthcoming. Others worry it may not be clear what products will be affected by the change in law. Jeremy Dedic, cofounder of Cubbington's Cabinet, a hemp retailer in Logan Square, estimated that 95% of his products will be banned under the new law and worries that the bill “does not create a viable, long-term path for responsible hemp businesses” to remain in operation, and warns that, “many wellness products will simply vanish from accessible retail, since marijuana dispensaries do not specialize in CBD wellness, minor cannabinoids, pet products, or the kind of consultative retail experience our customers prefer.” The inevitable confusion regarding prohibitions and the new regulatory structure might simply push customers and sellers into the black market. Regardless of enforcement at the state level, the changes will coincide with the federal ban taking effect in November which will independently criminalize certain hemp-derived products at the federal level, creating exposure for conduct that until recently was considered lawful.Anyone who currently operates in the hemp space in Illinois, or who is charged with a cannabis or hemp-related offense, faces a rapidly shifting legal landscape. Businesses that believe they are operating within the law today may find themselves on the wrong side of it this fall without taking the necessary steps to obtain proper licensure or discontinue certain product lines. For defendants already charged or soon to be charged in connection with hemp or marijuana products, experienced criminal defense counsel remains essential. As has always been the case in drug prosecutions, the classification of the alleged substance is a critical issue that can be challenged and certainly the way in which the alleged evidence was obtained. If you or someone you know faces criminal charges related to cannabis, hemp, or marijuana, contact an experienced criminal defense attorney who can provide the best available defenses in this changing landscape.]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Are States Trying to Ban Glocks?]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484862026-06-11T16:59:30Z2026-06-11T16:59:30ZWhat the New Wave of Pistol Design Legislation Means for Illinois Gun Owners and the Second AmendmentIf you own a “Glock” in Illinois, one of the most popular brands of semi-automatic pistols in the United States, you should be paying close attention to recent legislation introduced in the Illinois legislature this spring that is seeking to effectively ban the manufacturer from selling the handguns in the state in the future. On May 20, the Illinois House Gun Violence Prevention Committee voted 9-5 to advance House Bill 4471 which, although the bill does not name Glock specifically, targets theirs and other manufacturers’ design, as it would ban the sale of any semiautomatic pistol with a cruciform trigger bar. Supporters say that this design is what allows a pistol to be modified with an auto-sear, or as it is more commonly known a “switch,” which allows handguns of this design to be converted into a fully automatic weapon. The bill's sponsor, Illinois House Representative Justin Slaughter, characterized the measure as “a consumer product safety measure” rather than an outright gun ban. He pointed out that other manufacturers, including Illinois-based Springfield Armory, use different firing mechanisms that would remain legal to sell, and that Glock already markets a design in Europe that would be compliant under the proposed law. To support his argument about the potential danger these guns currently pose to Illinois residents, he cites Chicago police data which have reportedly recovered roughly 1,300 modified Glocks in connection with crimes in the city. Much like the controversial ban on AR-15s and other assault weapons that took effect in Illinois, which we have previously covered, the bill would be forward looking, meaning the government would grandfather in current owners of Glock handguns and instead ban future sales. While the bill did not receive a vote before the Illinois Assembly adjourned for the spring, its passage through committee means it is likely to be taken up in the fall or future sessions.
Court Challenges Likely to Follow Any Passage
Illinois is not acting alone in targeting the popular handguns. Four states, California, Maryland, Connecticut, and New York have already enacted similar bans, and the litigation challenging them is likely to quickly follow in the wake of their passing, if it has not already done so in some instances. And these legislative bans are only part of the strategy of states seeking to attack the manufacturer, with states and cities across the country simultaneously suing the manufacturer, including Minnesota, New Jersey, Maryland, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Seattle all alleging in suits that the company sold the pistols knowing that they could easily be effectively converted into machine guns with the installation of a switch, many of which are cheap and can be obtained using a 3-D printer. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison, in announcing their lawsuit, said he was initiating the lawsuit against the manufacturer because, “Glock’s actions, and their inaction, violate Minnesota law, and put kids, communities and law enforcement in danger. This has to stop. Today’s lawsuit against Glock is about protecting our kids and protecting the guardians who look out for us.” Chicago's own suit against Glock, filed nearly two years ago, is still working its way through the courts but echoes the allegation that the company knew the dangers of its design when it sold the guns in Chicago. The NRA, however, has been quick to countersue these bans and the manufacturer has defended itself consistently in the US courts. For now, the ban is not in effect in Illinois, and even its passage will be certainly met with challenges that could delay its implementation, much like the assault weapons ban had starts and stops as it made its way through the courts. Nonetheless, it could have far reaching consequences for individuals who are found to be carrying the popular handguns should it go into effect, potentially leading to criminal charges for both legally permitted gun owners and those who are not currently allowed to handle or possess firearms. ]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Can I Use A.I. as My Lawyer?]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484852026-06-05T13:20:34Z2026-06-05T13:20:34ZFrequent Hallucinations Still Common in A.I. ModelsWith the rapid development, hype, and proliferation of artificial intelligence, many non-lawyers may be asking themselves the question of whether or not they even need to hire a lawyer at this point to resolve their legal disputes or represent them in court. While artificial intelligence has rapidly transformed the legal landscape, offering powerful tools for research, drafting, and analysis for lawyers and laypeople alike and is undeniably exciting, the technology still has its problems, as we have previously covered. Even with the technology advancing, a recent ruling from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals serves as a stark reminder that A.I. is far from infallible, and that the consequences of over-reliance can be severe. Recently, the Ninth Circuit sanctioned two licensed California attorneys for submitting briefs riddled with AI-generated hallucinations, fabricated case citations, invented quotations, and misrepresented legal authority. The court suspended them from practice before the court for six months, fined each $2,500, and required them to disclose A.I. use in all future filings. “Lawyers using generative A.I. must thus be aware of the tendency of generative A.I. to make these mistakes and guard against them,” the ruling said. If seasoned lawyers can fall into this trap, and face serious professional consequences for it, the risks for an untrained person acting on AI-generated legal advice are exponentially greater.
Appearing “Pro Se” and Relying on A.I.
Self-representation is indeed a constitutional right for anyone facing charges in the United States, otherwise known as appearing “pro se.” But the option is one that judges and legal experts consistently caution against, particularly in criminal proceedings. Criminal law is a complex web of procedural rules, evidentiary standards, constitutional protections, and strategic considerations that take years to master. An A.I. chatbot, however sophisticated, cannot assess the specific facts of a case with the judgment of a trained advocate, negotiate with prosecutors, read a courtroom, strategize with any real sophistication, or provide the kind of relationship-driven counsel that often determines outcomes. Worse, as the Ninth Circuit did and countless other cases have, individuals were sanctioned for overreliance on the technology because it is far from perfect. A.I. can confidently present fabricated legal authority as real, even when prompted not to, and a defendant with no legal training would have no reliable way to know the difference. Given the stakes in a criminal proceedings, including the potential loss of freedom, abuse of constitutional rights, reputational harm, and the countless other factors that are held in the balance of the outcome, the simple truth is that a defendant’s right to counsel exists precisely because the legal system is too consequential and too complex to navigate relaying on A.I. alone and without the benefit of a seasoned advocate. That being said, it is undoubtedly a beneficial learning tool or starting point for understanding some basic legal concepts, but is not an adequate substitute for an experienced criminal defense attorney in any way.]]>On Behalf of Darryl A. Goldberg<![CDATA[Do I Qualify for Compassionate Release When the Law Changes?]]>https://www.goldbergdefense.com/?p=484842026-06-04T18:45:43Z2026-06-04T18:45:43ZSupreme Court Rules Sentencing Disparities Cannot Justify Early Release for Pre-First Step Act PrisonersWhenever Congress changes the laws and regulations around what kind of sentences should be handed down in criminal cases, inevitably some of the first questions many inmates already serving a sentence ask is simple: does this change apply to my case and/or can I get relief under the new rules? Often the key to this is whether or not a change was meant to be retroactive, meaning Congress expressly conveyed the desire for it to be a source of relief for previously sentenced individuals (which unfortunately is usually the case). Still, inmates in the federal system sentenced to lengthy prison sentences can ask for relief by filing a petition for “Compassionate Release” which has several criteria for early release, including a seemingly somewhat catch-all provision of “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” that has been elusive for Courts to define in the wake of its passing. One source of confusion was what relief was available for inmates that had previously received lengthy prison sentences under §924(c)’s notorious “stacking” provision. Congress effectively eliminated the provision in the First Step Act of 2018 for certain first-time offenders, including two inmates who recently challenged their sentences at the Supreme Court given that they would not been subject to such lengthy mandatory sentences had they been sentenced today under the new sentencing guidelines. Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie Carter both committed multiple armed robberies (in unrelated cases) where no one was ever injured and both received stacking sentences that subjected them to length minimum sentences, receiving, respectively, sentences of over 42 years for Rutherford (with a 32-year minimum thank to stacking provision instead of the current 14-year minimum he would face today) and 70 years imprisonment for Carter (who faced a 57-year minimum rather than the current 21-year minimum sentence). Faced with these disparities, they asked the Courts to review their appeals for Compassionate Release, arguing that the fact that they would have received a much shorter sentence if they were sentenced today should entitle an inmate to eligibility for early release. Unfortunately for both men and thousands of federal prisoners sentenced under laws that Congress has since softened, the definitive answer is a resounding “no” according to the Supreme Courts most recent ruling. Writing for the majority in Rutherford v. United States, Justice Amy Coney Barrett held that when Congress declines to make a sentencing change retroactive, the resulting disparity between old and new sentences is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” that warrants a sentence reduction under the federal compassionate release statute because the First Step Act was not retroactive and such lack of retroactivity is neither “extraordinary” nor “compelling” since such changes, “usually benefit only future offenders.” “When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive — as with the change to §924(c) — the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason that warrants a sentence reduction.”
What Does This Mean if I Want Compassionate Release?
Simply put, this ruling means that thousands of federal prisoners sentenced before 2018 under §924(c)’s stacking rules remain ineligible for the First Step Act’s reduced mandatory minimums by statute and district courts are not able to reduce their sentence under Compassionate Release because they do not qualify under the “extraordinary and compelling circumstances.” Prisoners serving lengthy sentences under other pre-reform laws, mandatory minimums for drug offenses not listed in the First Step Act, for example, who had hoped that compassionate release could bridge the gap between old and new sentencing norms now face a categorical bar on using sentencing disparity as a ground for release. Worse still for inmates, the ruling makes clear that it invalidated recent the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement that had added “Unusually Long Sentence” as a recognized ground for compassionate release, eliminating a tool many clients had been relying on. While Compassionate Release remains a viable option for some inmates, prisoners and their attorneys must now demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling” reasons rooted in other articulable circumstances in order to receive relief.]]>