The United States Supreme Court just announced an opinion that clarifies what factors a district court judge can consider when weighing sentencing options in response to a violation of supervised release. When district court judges hand out a sentence on the federal level, first they must calculate the advisory sentencing guideline range before considering what are referred to as 3553(a) factors, which are enumerated in the United States code, in order to hand a defendant a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” Along with any custodial sentence, a judge may (or in some cases is required to) impose a period of “supervised release” to be served after any custodial sentence, which is akin to what people commonly think of as “parole.” While on supervised release, a defendant is placed in a monitoring program that can have standard conditions (such as not committing a new crime, refraining from drug use, reporting to a US Probation officer, etc.) as well as special conditions tailored to what the judge may think an individual needs to promote their rehabilitation and reintegrate successfully into society (such as being on electronic monitoring, restricting travel, participating in counseling or education courses, etc.). Anyone who violates any condition is subject to a litany of options the judge in charge of their supervised release (typically the same sentencing judge but not always) may impose, which could range from a verbal or written reprimand to an extension of the supervised release or even a new term of imprisonment depending on the severity of the violation and what the judge feels is necessary under a list of enumerated factors.
In the case at issue, Esteras et al. v. United States, three separate individuals in separate cases, Edgardo Esteras, Timothy Jaimez, and Toriano Leaks, were sentenced to new terms of imprisonment after violating the terms of their supervised release. In Edgardo Esteras’ case, he had served a custodial sentence before being placed on supervised release, and the District Court revoked his supervised release after he was arrested for a domestic violence incident (though the charges were later dropped) and ordered a new term of imprisonment with the judge saying that his earlier sentence had been “rather lenient” and that the revocation and new prison term was necessary to “promote respect for the law.” Esteras challenged the district court’s reasoning, which the Sixth Circuit affirmed (in line with several other circuits’ interpretation of the appropriate approach) because, although there is significant overlap between the enumerated factors for handing an initial sentence under 3553(a) and for violations of supervised release, only 8 of the 10 factors are reiterated in the authority for judges to revoke, extend, or modify supervised release specified under 3583(e). Critically for Esteras, 3583(e) excludes the need for the sentence, “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”, as well as “the kinds of sentences available.” The government argued that the exclusion simply meant that a judge at a revocation hearing, “must consider the enumerated factors” listed in 3583(e) and “need not (but may)” consider the other factors listed in 3553(a) nonetheless. Writing for the 7-2 majority, Justice Amy Coney Barrett rejected the government’s argument, holding that when Congress wrote the law, it clearly left off the factor on purpose and thus a judge at a revocation hearing is forbidden from considering retribution in arriving at their decision. Citing Supreme Court precedent that differentiates an original sentence from the role of. supervised release revocation, Justice Barrett wrote that this “comports with the role of supervised release in our current criminal justice system” because “Supervised release, by contrast [from the original sentence], ‘is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.’” Elaborating, the Justice wrote in the opinion that, “when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.” This plain reading of the text should be welcome news for anyone subject to supervised release in the past, present, or future, as it places a critical limit on a district court judge’s authority in these proceedings. In fact, anyone facing a supervised release violation or who was recently incarcerated due to a violation of their supervised release should expeditiously review or acquire the transcript from their revocation hearing and work with an experienced federal criminal defense attorney to ensure that the judge did not improperly rely on these particular factors when revoking, extending, or otherwise modifying their term of supervised release, particularly those who may currently be imprisoned unjustifiably as a result of this overturning of precedent in several circuits.
