On June 18, 2026, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions that could have significant implications for certain defendants who are facing charges, serving custodial sentences, or have previously been adjudicated for possessing firearms with a history of drug use or those who were subject to an appellate waiver in their federal plea agreement. In both instances, the justices favored the defense over the government which could enable defendants to fight their cases in new and novel ways. In one, United States v. Hemani, the Court held that the government cannot send a person to prison for up to 15 years just for owning a gun while using marijuana and in the other, Hunter v. United States, the Court ruled that the appeal waiver buried in nearly every plea agreement is no longer infallible and is prone to challenges in certain instances.
Casual Marijuana Users Can Legally Possess a Firearm
The first decision strikes at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the provision that automatically bars anyone who is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing a firearm, the same provision previously used to charge Hunter Biden before he was pardoned. In the case at hand, Ali Hemani, a Texas-born dual citizen, told federal agents he used marijuana about every other day after an unrelated raid on his home he shared with his family in which he was cooperative with law enforcement and willingly showed them the location of the firearm and illegal substances. On that admission alone the government charged him under § 922(g)(3), exposing him to up to 15 years in prison and a lifetime firearms ban.
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, held that the prosecution of Hemani was unconstitutional. Applying the framework from the recent Bruen and Rahimi decisions that have drastically altered gun laws in the country (which we have previously covered), the Court rejected the government’s attempt to analogize § 922(g)(3) to historical “habitual drunkard” laws. As the Court put it, those laws “differ dramatically from § 922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision on every single metric the government invites us to consider: They targeted different kinds of people, did so for different purposes, and operated in different ways.” Specifically, in cautioning that the ruling was a narrow one, it explained that historical habitual-drunkard laws reached only those whose drinking “rendered them practically incapacitated and incapable of managing their affairs,” whereas the law as the government applied it to this case would, “automatically disarms anyone who regularly uses any amount of any controlled substance” without any showing of incapacity or danger. The Court was also weary of the process used for disarming people of their right to hold a firearm, as the historical laws referenced also generally required process before someone lost a constitutional right whereas this process, by contrast, “automatically divests an individual of his constitutional right to bear arms the moment he becomes an unlawful user…all without any pre-deprivation process.” Still the Court was quick to caution that this successful challenge does not apply to addicts or those currently under the influence of intoxicants, nor does it address those convicted of felonies generally and a footnote makes clear that, “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt” on the felon-in-possession and mentally-ill provisions of the legal prohibition on gun ownership. While it is not a magic-bullet for anyone accused of owning a firearm while also being a drug user, it draws a meaningful distinction and provides an ability to challenge any conviction or pending charges for accusations of similar drug history for individuals. It is also anticipated to lead to substantial litigation in various states that pose restrictions on concealed carry permits for those that also have medical marijuana licenses.
Appellate Waivers Are Significantly Weakened Under New Standard
In many standard federal plea agreements, the plea will contain a section in which the defendant agrees to waive any appeals of their sentence, with the limited exceptions such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or to challenge sentences based on sentencing guidelines that have subsequently changed and been made retroactive by an act of congress, Supreme Court ruling, or the Sentencing Commission. Generally, federal courts and prosecutors have treated the appeal waiver as the final word on any sentence some absent extremely limited and delineated exceptions. At a change of plea hearing, if the plea agreement calls for an appellate waiver, judges tend to make clear that when a defendant signs the plea agreement and agrees to its terms during the change of plea hearing, they give up their right to appeal their sentence, no matter what the judge does to you at sentencing with only narrow exceptions to that principle.
Munson Hunter pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud and waived his right to appeal. At sentencing, the district court ordered him, as a condition of supervised release, to take all mental-health medications prescribed by his physician, over his objection that he should not “be forced to medicate.” He tried to appeal that forced-medication condition. The Fifth Circuit said the waiver barred him, even assuming the condition was unconstitutional. In an 8-1 ruling, Justice Kagan writing for the majority held that, “We principally hold that an agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.” The Court was careful to set the bar high. As Justice Kagan put it, the rule “sets a high bar: The waiver may be set aside only if the sentence is marred by the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute. The error must be obvious—not one a judge could reasonably make. And it must be of the type that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary.” The Court went on to make clear that simple, ordinary sentencing mistakes will not render an appellate waiver unenforceable, stating, “Standard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law cannot cancel an appeal waiver.”
While this line of “egregious error” was not made clear, Justice Kagan gave three key examples and warned that these are by no means exclusive. The first is obvious, signaling out any sentence that exceeds “what the relevant statute allows—most commonly, a term of years above the maximum prescribed” meaning any sentence higher than what Congress authorized in making the conduct illegal. The second innumerate factor may be the most influential and broad going forward, being any sentence, “infected with a blatant constitutional error, such as when a judge takes account of a constitutionally impermissible factor (like race) or imposes a constitutionally infirm condition of supervised release” which means defendants can likely challenge sentences even with an appellate waiver when they feel the sentence handed down rests on impermissible factors. Third, a sentence “imposed without ‘some minimum of civilized procedure.’” Interestingly, in a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch previewed perhaps the next line of attack for defendants, flagging potential future challenges that a defendant cannot knowingly waive the right to appeal a sentence they have not yet received. Criminal defendants should pay attention to this issue should it become a new line of attack for sentences.
Taken together, these two decisions move real ground for federal defendants. If you signed an appeal waiver and received a sentence with a genuinely serious defect, a term above the statutory maximum, a supervised-release condition or sentencing factor that violates the Constitution, or a sentencing process that ignored basic procedural fairness, Hunter means that waiver may no longer bar your appeal. In Hemani, the opinion makes clear that the government can no longer rely on a bare “unlawful user” theory without individualized proof of dangerousness, at least on the facts the Court confronted, and can be used for pending cases or to seek post-conviction relief. Whether a new Supreme Court decision actually helps your case depends on the specific facts surrounding your conviction, the conditions of your sentence, and exactly where your case sits procedurally. If you have a pending federal case, or a family member currently in federal custody, and you think an appeal waiver, a supervised-release condition, or a § 922(g) charge based on being an unlawful user of drugs may be in play, contact a federal criminal defense attorney for an evaluation.
